

# Resolution Strategy: Multiple Point of Entry


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### Overseas structure of global banks



The way global banks plan to die should be consistent with the way they lived



### The Decentralised Subsidiary Model

#### **Parent sets**

Definition of protocols, oversight activity, group's strategy of liquidity growth, funding policy guidelines

### Credit risk managed independently

Subject to limits and tailored to specific host regulatory requirements

Consistent with Group common risk culture

#### **Locally incorporated subsidiaries**

Stand-alone entities with their own capital and liquidity management

Supervised by host, covered by local DGS

#### Self sufficient in funding

Retail model, reliant on local currency deposits. Subsidiaries raise funds locally No systematic intragroup support. It is an option if needed, but at market prices

**Independent governance** 



### Decentralised subsidiary model characteristics

#### **Features**

Self-standing subsidiaries: independent risk assessment

Natural firewalls due to absence of interconections

Accountability & transparency

Straight forward resolution

Development of local financial systems

#### At the cost of

Lower economies of scale

Lower capital and funding management optimization



### Strong resilience and limited systemic risk

#### **Experiences with crisis in home and host countries**

**Firewalls** between different parts of the group work in both directions

Romania

Crisis in **host** country: Argentina 2001

Crisis in **home** country: Eurozone sovereian crisis 2010-2012


Spanish banks stayed in Argentina (long term orientation), but having the option to leave strengthened their position


**No evidence of contagion** of liquidity problems in home to hosts

#### Changes in external loans of BIS-reporting banks to the bank sector

Source: BBVA Research based on BIS International Banking Statistics (Table 7)









### The new resolution framework's challenges

#### G-20 commitment in 2011

"The new resolution framework should set out the responsibilities, instruments and powers to enable authorities to resolve failing financial firms in an orderly manner, by protecting critical functions and without exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss".

Global banks need to be viable, albeit resoluble


**Financial models:** enough loss-absorbing liabilities (Loss-Absorbing Capacity - LAC)


**Legal entity structures:** clear and feasible mapping of interdependences

**Operating model:** operational continuity of shared services



#### Decentralised Model & MPE resolution scheme







	Multiple-Point-of-Entry
Point-of-entry	<b>Subsidiary</b> - failure individual subsidiaries
Resolution powers	Host authority -subsidiary
Authority role	Home - Coordinator & local executor Host - Executor (local)
Losses / bail-in	Local losses - parent voluntary support
LAC (*) placed to third investors	LAC at <b>individual</b> level
Legal structure	Subsidiary
Operational services	Operational subsidiariziation: Decentralized or centralized



### A hybrid scheme is possible







### The TLAC is the complement to the bail-in

Banks need to have sufficient resources to **absorb losses in resolution** to avoid the need for a bail-out with public funds


An adequate amount of TLAC should facilitate the implementation of a resolution strategy with a **recapitalization at a level** that promotes **market confidence** and meets going-concern regulatory **capital requirements** 



**Protecting taxpayers** 



#### **Protecting critical functions**






## In MPE, TLAC should be placed in each point of entry

TLAC placement principle

The appropriate allocation of TLAC will be determined by the **preferred resolution strategy**: at parent level under an SPE scheme and at subsidiary level under an MPE scheme.



TLAC should be required at individual but not at consolidated level

The individual TLAC should be based on the local resolution regime established by the host authority

The individual TLAC requirement should have similar features to local entities ensuring the level-playing field



### Operational continuity is a key resolution issue

**Effective operational subsidiarisation** 

"...this entails the provision of critical shared services or functions out of adequately capitalised separate legal entities that are dedicated to service provision (FSB July 2013)

For example, operational subsidiarisation helps to maintain critical functions in both, the good- and the bad-bank when authorities apply a bridge-bank resolution strategy





Maintaining shared services in or for a particular entity when the bank or another part of the group fails is the main objective of the operational subsidiarisation.

Removing resolution obstacles



### Operational subsidiarization in an MPE





Decentralised scheme

Centralised + subsidiary scheme

Centralised + subsidiary scheme

Centralised + branch scheme

Easier MPE resolution

**Complex MPE resolution** 



#### Conclusions

- There is no unique foreign bank business paradigm. Resolution strategy should be aligned with business model
- MPE is appropriate for global decentralized retail banks, funded with deposits, supervised by the host authorities and with no systematic intragroup positions
- 3 SPE and MPE are extreme models, in practice many banks' strategies would be hybrid
- The TLAC in MPE should be based on the local regime established by the host authority with similar characteristics to the local entities
- The operational subsidiarization in the MPE model could be organized under two schemes: centralized and decentralized

The MPE model is consistent with progress towards banking union and the Eurozone ultimately becoming a single jurisdiction



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