

Country Risk Report A Quarterly Guide to Country Risks

March 2019

(Data as of February 28th)



Summary

Ratings Greece and Russia were upgraded by Moody's, and Hungary was upgraded by S&P and Fitch. agencies • Overall stability across different regions and countries in CDS sovereign markets. Limited contagion from the spike in volatility seen in equity markets in December. CDS have also remained stable afterwards. Few changes from our last quarter outlook regarding CDS implicit gaps, which are close to neutral in most cases. High downgrade or upgrade pressures are concentrated on a few specific countries. → **Financial** Global Risk Aversion have gone through a rollercoaster during the last three months. December Markets saw a surged, specially in equity markets, followed by a strong slump in January and February, thanks to the FED's announcement of a more patient stance in its interest rates' policy Overall stability in Emerging Markets (EM) currencies despite the volatility in equity markets. Country Risk • The median agencies' rating for EM Europe has improved, reducing the gap with BBVA Research rating and the CDS markets' implicit rating. • While overall private sector and corporate leverage in Core European countries are on the rise, making it the **most financially vulnerable region**, it is also the region with the lowest fiscal vulnerabilities. BBVA • On the contrary, financial vulnerabilities seem to be decreasing throughout all other regions, but Research again on the contrary, fiscal vulnerabilities still remain high. • Private leverage disequilibria are currently concentrated in some advanced economies (Canada, Belgium, Netherlands) and in China and HK in EMs. Turkey's debt level has plunged in the last

quarter of 2018, erasing its gap almost completely.

· Housing prices gaps point to high imbalances in several countries that also have clear

vulnerabilities in their credit markets, such as Canada, China and HK.



Index

01 Sovereign Markets and Ratings Update

Evolution of sovereign ratings
Evolution of sovereign CDS by country
Market downgrade/upgrade pressure

02 Financial Markets, Financial Tensions and Global Risk Aversion

Global Risk Aversion Evolution According to Different Measures Financial Tensions EMs FX Synchronization Indicator

03 Macroeconomic Vulnerability and In-house Regional Country Risk Assessment

Equilibrium CDS by regions BBVA-Research sovereign ratings by regions Vulnerability Radars by regions

04 Assessment of Financial and External Disequilibria

Private Credit Gaps by Country
Housing Prices Gaps by Country
Early Warning System of Banking Crises by regions
Early Warning System of Currency Crises by regions

- Vulnerability Indicators Table by Country
- Methodological Appendix

Sovereign Markets and Ratings Update


Evolution of sovereign CDS by country Evolution of sovereign ratings Market downgrade/upgrade pressure







Sovereign Rating Index 2013-19



- Few changes from rating Agencies. On a regional basis, median ratings remain constant.
- Greece was upgraded by Moody's
- Russia was upgraded by Moody's
- Hungary was upgraded by S&P and Fitch
- Paraguay was upgraded by Fitch.
- Pakistan was downgraded by S&P and Fitch





Sovereign Rating Index 2013-19: Developed Markets







Sovereign Rating Index 2013-19: Emerging Markets




7
















Sovereign markets and agencies ratings update

Markets vs. ratings pressure gap (Last date: February 28, 2019)

Peripheral



Source: BBVA Research

Core

Few changes from our last quarter outlook. CDS implicit gaps are close to neutral in most cases. High downgrade or upgrade pressures are concentrated on a few specific countries (Italy, Mexico, Thailand). By regions, EM Europe stands out because of its positive pressure

EM Europe

LatAm

Asia

02

Financial Markets, Financial Tensions and Global Risk Aversion

Global Risk Aversion Evolution according to Different Measures
Financial Tensions Index
EMs FX Synchronization Indicator








Global Risk Aversion (GRA)

Global risk aversion indicators: VIX & FTI (Monthly average)



Source: Bloomberg and BBVA Research

Global risk aversion indicators: BAA Spread & Global component in sovereign CDS (Monthly Average)




*The global component of sovereign CDS corresponds to the first component from a PCA Analysis on 51 CDS from both EMs and DMS Source: FED. Datastream and BBVA Research





Financial tensions (FT) and global risk aversion



Overall easing of Financial Tensions since the beginning of the year, following the surge seen in December. The relaxation of tensions have been more noticeable in US and LatAm








EMs FX Synchronization Indicator

Synchronization of EMs FX changes:

Warning indicator based on Median EM FX changes and Synchronization Indicator



Based on our estimated FX Synchronization index and the median change in EM markets currencies, our warning indicator takes the maximum value when (on average) EM FX rates are depreciating strongly and there is a high degree of synchronization (intense red). On the other hand, the minimum value of the warning index occurs when on average FX rates are appreciating strongly and in a synchronized fashion (intense blue). The intermediate colors include several possible combinations of lower levels of depreciation/appreciation and/or lower degrees of synchronization.

Source: BBVA Research

03

Macroeconomic vulnerability and in-house Regional country risk assessment


BBVA-Research sovereign ratings by regions
Equilibrium CDS by regions
Vulnerability Radars by regions







CDS and equilibrium risk premium: February 2019



Periphery UE excludes Greece; Latam includes: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. It excludes Argentina and Venezuela Source: BBVA Research and Datastream








Agencies' sovereign rating vs. BBVA Research rating and Market's Implicit rating

Median Agencies' Rating, BBVA's rating average (+/-1 std. dev.) and CDS implicit rating



Source: Standard & Poor's, Moody's, Fitch & BBVA Research.

Latam includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. CDS implicit rating excludes Argentina and Venezuela

The median agencies' rating for EM Europe has improved, approaching BBVA Research rating and CDS implicit rating. Our median rating has not changed for any region in the last quarter and overall the three types of ratings are not more than one notch apart, with the exception of LatAm








Developed markets: vulnerability radar 2019


(Relative position for the developed countries. Risk equal to threshold=0,8, Min risk=0. Previous year data is shown as a dotted line)

G7: High levels of public debt and weak economic growth continue to be the main vulnerabilities

Core Europe Private sector and Corporate leverage are on the rise and are the main vulnerabilities. However, it is the region with the lowest fiscal vulnerability

Periphery EU: Unemployment, public & external debt levels and institutional risks remain as highest vulnerabilities. Private leverage vulnerabilities continue improving





Macro: (1) GDP (% YoY) (2) Prices (% YoY) (3) Unemployment (% LF)

Fiscal: (4) Structural balance (%) (5) Interest rate – GDP %YoY (6) Public debt (% GDP)

Liquidity: (7) Debt by non-residents (%total) (8) Financial needs (%GDP) (9) Financial pressure (% GDP)

External: (10) External debt (%GDP) (11) RER appreciation (%YoY) (12) CAC balance (%GDP)

Credit: (13) Household (%GDP) (14) Corporate (%GDP) (15) Credit-to-deposit (%)

Assets: (16) Private credit to GDP (%YoY) (17) Housing Prices (%YoY)

(18) Equity (%)

Safe

Institutional: (19) Political stability (20) Corruption (21) Rule of law








Emerging markets: vulnerability radar 2019 (Relative position for the emerging countries. Risk equal to threshold=0,8, Min risk=0. Previous year data is shown as a dotted line)


EM Europe: High vulnerabilities in external debt and debt held by non-residents. Other vulnerabilities are contained and remain unchanged

LatAm: Public debt levels stand out and continues to be the highest vulnerability. All Macro vulnerabilities are improving

EM Asia: Private leverage vulnerabilities keep on improving (including corporates & households). Fiscal vulnerabilities remain unchanged







Macro: (1) GDP (% YoY) (2) Prices (% YoY) (3) Unemployment (% LF)

Fiscal: (4) Structural balance (%) (5) Interest rate – GDP %YoY (6) Public debt (% GDP)

Liquidity: (7) Debt by non-residents (%total) (8) Financial needs (%GDP) (9) Financial pressure (% GDP)

External: (10) External debt (%GDP) (11) RER appreciation (%YoY) (12) CAC balance (%GDP)

Credit: (13) Household (%GDP) (14) Corporate (%GDP) (15) Credit-to-deposit (%)

Assets: (16) Private credit to GDP Gap (%) (17) Housing Prices Gap (%)

(18) Equity (%)

Institutional: (19) Political stability (20) Corruption (21) Rule of law

04

Assessment of financial and external disequilibria

Private credit gaps by country
Housing prices gaps by country
Early warning system of banking crises by regions
Early warning system of currency crises by regions








Private leverage imbalances are currently concentrated in some advanced economies (Canada, Belgium, Netherlands) and in China and HK in EM. Turkey's debt has plunged, erasing its gap almost completely.

Private debt color map (2003-2018 Q4)

(Gap between private debt-to-GDP ratio and its long-term structural trend)



Private leverage disequilibrium continues to be quite high in Canada, and continues to grow up in UK. The gap is currently negative in USA and Japan

Although most countries in Europe are currently deleveraging, private debt levels continues to be above fundamentals in Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and Greece.

Private Debt-to-GDP ratio has plummeted in Turkey, bringing its gap close to zero. Other EM Europe countries maintain their deleveraging processes and leverage below their structural levels.

Debt ratio levels in LatAm continue to be close to or below their structural trends, with the exception of Chile.

Private leverage in China has grown again increasing the gap vs. its equilibrium levels. HK leverage is moderating but continues at at very high levels of disequilibrium. Some signs of disequilibria can be seen in Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines.

found at: https://goo.gl/r0BLbI Source: IFS, BIS & BBVA Research.


Excess: Private debt ratio higher than 20% above trend High: Private debt ratio between 10%-20% above trend Mild: Private debt ratio between 6%-10% above trend Low: Private debt ratio between 0% and 6% above trend De-Leveraging: Private debt ratio below its long-term trend Non Available Data





Housing prices gaps point to high imbalances in several countries that also have clear vulnerabilities in their credit markets, such as Canada, China and HK. Similarly, prices in Turkey are also plummeting alongside its private credit

Real housing prices color map (2003-2018 Q4) (Gap between real housing prices and their trend (Hodrick-Prescott)



Housing prices gaps remain high in Japan and Canada (the latter coincide with a high credit-gap)

The gap also remain high in Germany and Portugal, while prices show an "excess growth" level in Iceland.

Real price levels appear to be excessive in Hungary, and to a lesser extent in Czech Republic, while they have entered into negative territory in Turkey

Prices in LatAm continue slowing down throughout the region after showing signs of excess in previous years. Chile and Colombia still show mild price gaps levels.

Hong Kong property prices have cooled down in the quarter, although they show a very high volatility. Its housing price gap coincides with the excess gap in private debt. Prices in China and Thailand also remain at high levels with respect to their trends

Source: BBVA Research, BIS, Haver and Oxford Economics.

Excess: Real house prices higher than 20% above trend High: Real house prices between 10%20% above trend MId: Real house prices between 6%10% above trend Low: Real house prices between 0% and 6% above trend De-Leveraging: Real house prices below its long-term tree Non Available Data

^{*}https://goo.gl/xXj3Gm








Early warning system (EWS) of Banking Crises (1999Q1-2021Q4)

(Probability of Systemic Banking Crisis (based on 8-quarters lagged data*):



- A banking crisis in a given country follows the definition by Laeven and Valencia (2012), which is shown in the Appendix
- The complete description of the methodology can be found at https://goo.gl/r0BLbl and at https://goo.gl/VA8xXv
- The probabilities shown are the simple average of the estimated individual countries probabilities for each region. The definition of each region is shown in the Appendix

^{*}The probability of a crisis in Q4-2016 is based on Q4-2014 data. Source: BBVA Research





Early warning system (EWS) of Currency Crisis Risk: probability of currency tensions The probability of a crisis is based on 4-quarters lagged data, e.g. Probability in Q4-2016 is based on Q4-2015 data



- Our Currency-Crises Early Warning System EWS allows us to estimate the probability of a currency crisis, which is defined as a "large" fall in the exchange rate and in foreign reserves in a given country, according to certain predefined measures.
- The probabilities shown in the table are the simple average of the individual countries probabilities for each region. The list of the leading indicators used in the estimation of the probability and the definition of each region are shown in the Appendix.

Source: BBVA Research

Exchange rates tensions have remained muted in the most recent months. Risks continue to be concentrated in certain specific countries and there are no signals of commonly shared vulnerabilities across whole regions, although some warning signs are returning to South America



Vulnerability Indicators table by country



Vulnerability Indicators Table





Vulnerability indicators* 2019: developed markets

	Fiscal sustainability		External sustainability			Liquidity management			Macroeconomic performance			Credit and housing			Private debt			Institutional			
		Interest rate GDP growth differential 2016-21	Gross public debt (1)	Current account balance (1)	External debt (1)	RER appreciatio n (2)	Gross financial needs (1)	Short-term public debt (3)	Debt held by non- residents (3)	GDP growth (4)	Consumer prices (4)	Unemployme nt rate (5)	Private credit to GDP growth (4)	Real housing prices growth (4)	Equity markets growth (4)	Househol d debt (1)	NF corporate debt (1)	Financial liquidity (6)	WB political stability (7)	WB control corruption (7)	WB rule of law (7)
United States	-3.3	-1.2	108	-2.8	96	3	19	18	32	2.5	1.7	3.8	-2.5	9.2	-5.6	76.7	74.4	71.1	-0.3	-1.4	-1.6
Canada	-0.9	-0.1	85	-2.5	114	-3	10	10	26	2.0	2.1	6.2	26.4	10.8	-11.6	99.6	122.3	128.1	-1.1	-1.9	-1.8
Japan	-3.3	-1.1	237	3.8	72	0	36	16	11	0.9	1.7	2.9	-18.9	11.1	-12.1	57.6	100.6	48.8	-1.1	-1.5	-1.6
Australia	-0.2	-1.2	41	-3.1	105	-3	4	4	44	2.8	2.4	5.0	17.5	2.3	-7.4	119.5	74.6	134.6	-0.9	-1.8	-1.7
Korea	1.4	-1.1	40	4.7	26	1	1	7	13	2.6	1.9	3.7	-23.6	4.1	-17.3	97.7	99.7	99.9	-0.3	-0.5	-1.2
Norway	-10.5	-2.6	36	7.8	154	-1	-9	0	49	2.1	2.0	3.7	12.2	-8.8	-0.5	100.0	141.2	147.4	-1.2	-2.2	-2.0
Sweden	0.5	-2.9	34	2.8	177	-4	4	11	38	2.2	1.6	6.2	10.3	-0.7	-10.7	88.7	155.4	184.5	-1.0	-2.1	-1.9
Denmark	-0.8	0.1	34	7.5	152	0	5	12	38	1.9	1.8	5.3	14.4	-0.6	-13.0	117.3	122.2	284.7	-0.9	-2.2	-1.9
Finland	-0.8	-1.7	60	0.9	152	1	6	11	81	1.8	1.7	7.4	25.1	-8.7	-8.0	66.8	115.5	140.1	-1.1	-2.2	-2.0
UK	-0.3	-0.4	87	-3.2	297	-6	8	8	37	1.5	2.1	4.2	6.2	-2.7	-12.5	86.6	80.4	57.1	-0.3	-1.8	-1.7
Austria	0.6	-1.7	71	1.8	168	2	8	8	81	2.2	2.1	5.1	-10.3	10.7	-19.7	50.2	95.9	95.0	-1.0	-1.5	-1.8
France	-1.0	-1.2	96	-0.7	210	1	14	8	61	1.6	2.2	8.5	2.2	-7.6	-11.0	58.2	141.5	110.3	-0.2	-1.3	-1.4
Germany	1.5	-2.2	56	7.9	138	2	3	8	54	1.9	1.9	3.4	-0.3	15.9	-18.3	53.6	55.0	88.8	-0.6	-1.8	-1.6
Netherlands	0.5	-1.8	50	9.7	500	2	4	14	48	2.6	1.7	3.8	17.6	2.7	-10.4	101.9	170.0	103.0	-0.9	-1.9	-1.8
Belgium	0.8	-1.0	100	-0.1	227	3	27	16	64	1.5	1.6	6.6	26.6	-6.9	-16.1	60.7	163.5	57.8	-0.4	-1.5	-1.3
Italy	2.1	0.5	129	1.6	115	0	14	16	37	1.0	1.4	10.5	15.2	-9.1	-16.1	41.3	69.9	98.8	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3
Spain	-0.5	-1.1	85	1.2	161	1	17	15	52	2.2	1.7	14.7	-24.3	-6.2	-15.0	59.3	93.7	95.5	-0.3	-0.5	-1.0
Ireland	0.9	-2.2	64	6.7	660	0	8	10	70	4.0	1.3	5.1	-30.0	14.6	-22.1	46.6	202.5	48.2	-1.0	-1.5	-1.4
Portugal	2.6	-0.5	117	-0.3	208	0	16	10	62	1.8	-2.5	6.7	-0.1	19.9	-6.5	68.2	103.6	110.3	-1.1	-0.9	-1.1
Greece	5.8	-1.8	177	-0.4	217	0	15	8	82	2.4	1.3	18.1	30.8	-11.2	-23.6	56.1	66.5	119.6	0.1	0.1	-0.1



Vulnerability Indicators Table





Vulnerability indicators* 2019: emerging markets

	Fiscal sustainability		External sustainability			Liquidity management			Macroeconomic performance			Credit and housing			Private debt			Institutional			
		Interest rate GDP growth differential 2016-21	Gross public debt (1)	Current account balance (1)	External debt (1)	RER appreciati on (2)	Gross financial needs (1)	Reserves to short- term external debt (3)	Debt held by non- residents (3)	GDP growth (4)		Unemployme nt rate (5)	Private credit to GDP growth (4)	Real housing prices growth (4)	Equity markets growth (4)	Househol d debt (1)	NF corporate debt (1)		WB political stability (7)	WB control corruption (7)	WB rule of law (7)
Bulgaria	-0.5	0.4	23	1.6	62	3.4	4	1.8	44	3.1	2.3	5.5	-27.2	5.9	-12.3	20	78	73	-0.4	0.2	0.0
Czech Rep	1.9	-1.8	32	-0.9	76	4.6	7	22	50	3.0	2.1	3.0	-4.4	11.0	-8.5	32	58	83	-1.0	-0.6	-1.1
Croatia	2.4	-0.6	71	2.3	71	1.3	12	3.7	40	2.6	1.5	11.2	-8.1	0.6	-5.1	33	25	85	-0.7	-0.2	-0.3
Hungary	-0.3	-2.2	69	2.1	89	-0.3	18	1.0	44	3.3	3.1	3.5	-16.4	30.2	-0.6	18	78	84	-0.8	-0.1	-0.5
Poland	-0.5	-2.1	48	-1.3	65	0.5	7	1.6	55	3.5	2.9	4.0	-6.6	-7.3	-9.5	35	90	107	-0.5	-0.7	-0.5
Romania	-2.9	-2.9	39	-3.4	44	1.3	8	1.6	52	3.4	2.8	4.8	-17.3	-13.1	-4.8	15	33	81	-0.1	0.0	-0.4
Russia	2.2	0.3	15	5.2	27	-2.7	1	5.3	23	1.8	5.7	5.3	-11.1	-18.9	13.3	17	48	107	0.7	0.9	0.8
Turkey	-2.0	0.0	34	-2.2	54	0.6	7	0.6	37	1.0	14.5	13.5	5.3	-8.0	-20.9	14	63	120	1.8	0.2	0.3
Argentina	-0.9	-11.6	72	-3.2	58	-24.3	15	1.2	39	-1.0	30.0	9.9	-3.9	-21.8	0.8	7	16	73	-0.2	0.3	0.2
Brazil	-1.3	1.7	91	-1.6	32	-6.5	15	4.0	9	2.4	4.2	10.7	-0.1	-26.7	15.0	28	41	88	0.4	0.5	0.3
Chile	-1.4	-2.0	26	-2.7	56	-1.2	3	1.5	30	3.4	3.0	6.5	7.2	9.1	-8.3	35	52	164	-0.4	-1.0	-1.0
Colombia	0.2	0.2	48	-2.4	38	-3.6	5	2.7	31	3.6	3.0	9.1	2.7	9.1	-2.9	22	24	120	0.8	0.4	0.4
Mexico	1.3	0.5	54	-1.3	37	-3.7	9	3.4	31	2.5	3.1	3.5	0.7	1.7	-16.8	16	25	85	0.6	0.9	0.6
Peru	-0.8	-2.6	26	-1.9	35	-0.4	3	6.6	31	3.9	2.1	6.0	3.7	-2.3	-3.1	16	36	113	0.3	0.5	0.5
China	1.3	0.5	54	-1.3	37	-3.7	9	3.4	31	2.5	3.1	3.5	0.7	1.7	-16.8	16	25	85	0.6	0.9	0.6
India	-1.7	-3.6	68	-2.5	18	-1.9	11	3.6	6	7.4	3.9	3.5	-0.2	-0.4	5.9	11	42	80	0.8	0.2	0.0
Indonesia	-0.5	-3.1	30	-2.4	32	-2.2	4	2.2	61	5.1	4.0	5.0	-0.4	6.8	-2.5	17	23	102	0.5	0.3	0.3
Malaysia	-0.7	-2.0	54	2.3	59	-0.5	11	1.0	30	4.6	2.5	3.0	9.7	5.5	-5.9	89		112	-0.2	0.0	-0.4
Philippines	0.9	-4.1	39	-1.5	18	-2.7	4	4.8	25	6.6	3.7	5.5	8.0	3.1	-12.8	4	42	72	1.2	0.5	0.4
Thailand	-0.2	-2.5	41	8.1	31	2.5	5	3.1	13	3.9	1.1	0.7	12.5	9.9	-10.8	70	46	100	0.8	0.4	0.0



Methodological Appendix



Methodology: indicators and maps

- Financial Stress Map: It stresses levels of stress according to the normalised time series movements. Higher positive standard units (1.5 or higher) stand for high levels of stress (dark blue) and lower standard deviations (-1.5 or below) stand for lower level of market stress (lighter colours)
- Sovereign Rating Index: An index that translates the letter codes of the three important rating agencies' rating (Moody's, Standard & Poors and Fitch) to numerical positions from 20 (AAA) to default (0). The index shows the average of the three rescaled numerical ratings
- Sovereign CD Swaps Maps: It shows a colour map with six different ranges of CD Swaps quotes (darker >500, 300 to 500, 200 to 300, 100 to 200, 50 to 100 and the lighter below 50 bp)
- Downgrade Pressure Gap: The gap shows the difference between the implicit ratings according to the Credit Default Swaps and the current ratings index (numerically scaled from default (0) to AAA (20)). We calculate implicit probabilities of default (PD) from the observed CDS and the estimated equilibrium spread. For the computation of these PDs we follow a standard methodology as described in Chan-Lau (2006), and we assume a constant Loss Given Default of 0.6 (Recovery Rate equal to 0.4) for all the countries in the sample. We use the resulting PDs in a cluster analysis to classify each country at every point in time in one of 20 different categories (ratings) to emulate the same 20 categories used by the rating agencies. From June 2019 on, the cluster analysis is performed recursively, starting with an initial sample going from Jan-2004 to Dec-2008 and adding one month at each step, generating monthly specific thresholds for determining the implicit ratings.
- The graph plots the difference between CDS-implied sovereign rating and the actual sovereign rating index, in notches. Higher positive differences account for potential Upgrade pressures and negative differences account for Downgrade potential. We consider the +/- 2 notches area as being Neutral
- Vulnerability Radars: A Vulnerability Radar shows a static and comparative vulnerability for different countries. For this we assigned several dimensions of vulnerabilities, each of them represented by three vulnerability indicators. The dimensions included are: Macroeconomics, Fiscal, Liquidity, External, Excess Credit and Assets, Private Balance Sheets and Institutional. Once the indicators are compiled, we reorder the countries in percentiles from 0 (lower ratio among the countries) to 1 (maximum vulnerabilities) relative to their group (Developed Economies or Emerging Markets). Furthermore, Inner positions (near 0) in the radar shows lower vulnerability, while outer positions (near 1) stand for higher vulnerability. Furthermore, we normalize each value with respect to given risk thresholds, whose values have been computed according to our own analysis or empirical literature. If the value of a variable is equal to the threshold, it would take a value of 0.8 in the radar



Appendix Methodology: indicators and maps

Risk Thresholds Table

Vulnerability Dimensions	Risk thresholds Developed Economies	Risk thresholds emerging economies	Risk direction	Research
Macroeconomics				
GDP	1.5	3.0	Lower	BBVA Research
Inflation	4.0	10.0	Higher	BBVA Research
Unemployment	10.0	10.0	Higher	BBVA Research
Fiscal vulnerability			_	
Cyclically adjusted deficit ("Strutural Deficit")	-4.2	-0.5	Lower	Baldacci et Al (2011). Assesing fiscal stress. IMF WP 11/100
Expected interest rate GDP growth diferential 5 years ahead	3.6	1.1	Higher	Baldacci et Al (2011). Assesing fiscal stress. IMF WP 11/100
Gross public bebt	73.0	43.0	Higher	Baldacci et Al (2011). Assesing fiscal stress. IMF WP 11/100
Liquidity problems			-	
Gross financial needs	17.0	21.0	Higher	Baldacci et Al (2011). Assesing fiscal stress. IMF WP 11/100
Debt held by non residents	84.0	40.0	Higher	Baldacci et Al (2011). Assesing fiscal stress. IMF WP 11/101
Short term debt pressure			, and the second	
Public short-term debt as % of total public debt (Developed)	9.1		Higher	Baldacci et Al (2011). Assesing fiscal stress. IMF WP 11/100
Reserves to short-term debt (Emerging)		0.6	Lower	Baldacci et Al (2011). Assesing fiscal stress. IMF WP 11/100
External Vulnerability				
Current account balance (% GDP)	4.0	6.0	Lower	BBVA Research
External debt (% GDP)	200.0	60.0	Higher	BBVA Research
Real exchange rate (Deviation from 4 yr average)	5.0	10.0	Higher	EU Commission (2012) and BBVA Research
Private Balance Sheets				
Household debt (% GDP)	84.0	84.0	Higher	Chechetti et al (2011). "The real effects of debt". BIS Working Paper 352 & EU Comission (2012)
Non-financial corporate debt (% GDP)	90.0	90.0	Higher	Chechetti et al (2011). "The real effects of debt". BIS Working Paper 352 & EU Comission (2013)
Financial liquidity (Credit/Deposits)	130.0	130.0	Higher	EU Commission (2012) and BBVA Research
Excess Credit and Assets				
Private credit to GDP (annual change)	8.0	8.0	Higher	IMF global financial stability report
Real housing prices growth (% YoY)	8.0	8.0	Higher	IMF global financial stability report
Equity growth (% YoY)	20.0	20.0	Higher	IMF global financial stability report
Institutions			-	
Political stability	0.2 (9th percentile)	-1.0 (8th percentile)	Lower	World Bank governance Indicators
Control of corruption	0.6 (9th percentile)	-0.7 (8th percentile)	Lower	World Bank governance Indicators
Rule of caw	0.6 (8th percentile)	-0.6 (8 th percentile)	Lower	World Bank governance Indicators




Methodology: models and BBVA country risk

- BBVA Research sovereign ratings methodology: We compute our sovereign ratings by averaging four alternative sovereign rating models developed at BBVA Research:
- Credit Default Swaps Equilibrium Panel Data Models: This model estimates actual and forecast equilibrium levels of CDS for 48 developed and emerging countries and 10 macroeconomic explanatory variables. The CDS equilibrium is calculated using the centered 5-year moving average of the explanatory variables weighted according to their estimated sensitivities. For estimating the equilibrium level, the BAA spread is left unchanged at its long-term median level (2003-2016). The values of these equilibrium CDS are finally converted to a 20 scale sovereign rating scale.
- Sovereign Rating Panel Data Ordered Probit with Fixed Effects Model: The model estimates a sovereign rating index (a 20 numerical scale index of the three sovereign rating agencies) through ordered probit panel data techniques. This model takes into account idiosyncratic fundamental stock and flows sustainability ratios allowing for fixed effects, thus including idiosyncratic country-specific effects
- Sovereign Rating Panel Data Ordered Probit without Fixed Effects Model: We used the estimates of the previous model but retaining only the contribution of the macroeconomic and institutional variables, without adding the country "fixed-effect" contribution. In this way we are able to account more clearly for the effect of only those macroeconomic variables that we can identify.
- Sovereign Rating Individual OLS Models: These models estimate the sovereign rating index (a 20 numerical scale index of the three sovereign rating agencies) individually. Furthermore, parameters for the different vulnerability indicators are estimated taken into account the history of the country, independent of others. The estimation comes from Oxford Economics Forecasting (OEF) for the majority of countries. For those countries that are not analysed by OEF, we estimate a similar OLS individual model.



Methodology: models and BBVA country risk

BBVA Research sovereign ratings methodology diagram



31



Methodology: Synchronization Indicator

- Synchronization Indicator: This indicator measures by how much all the exchange rates (against USD) in a group of 23 emerging economies are moving together during a period of 15 days (rolling window). A more extensive description of the methodology will be included in a forthcoming note. We first calculate the daily percentage change of the exchange rate of each one of the 23 countries using a daily sample of FX rates changes that goes from Janury-2004 to the last available date. Then, we estimate through a PCA a unique common factor using all the observations in the whole sample of 3576 days. Additionally, we also estimate the daily median of FX changes for the 23 countries (changes are standardized).
- The weights that each country has on the common factor are kept constant during the whole sample. However, we estimate in a daily fashion how much this common factor explains of the total variation in the 23 countries' FX rates (R2) within a rolling period including the latest 15 days. We assume that the highest the R2 the higher the Synchronization or comovement of the 23 FX rates. This moving-R2 corresponds to the dark blue line in the graph shown in slide 19. The dotted red line corresponds to the average within the latest 15 days of the daily median change among the 23 countries.
- Once we have estimated the Synchronization index and the median change in EM markets, we construct a warning indicator that takes the maximum value when (on average) EM FX rates are depreciating strongly and there is a high degree of Synchronization (intense red). On the other hand, the minimum value of the warning index occurs when on average FX rates are appreciating strongly and in a synchronized fashion (intense blue). The intermediate colors include several possible combinations of lower levels of depreciation/appreciation and/or lower degrees of Synchronization.



Methodology: Credit Gaps (Debt-to-GDP)

• Credit Gaps (Debt-to-GDP): The methodology is based on the idea that the long-term relationship between the Private Credit-to-GDP ratio and income per capita follows a non-linear relationship with a saturation level at the highest levels of income, i.e. a Gompertz-curve type of relationship. Thus we assume the following relationship between the credit ratio and income per capita:

$$\frac{C}{V} = \alpha \cdot \exp(\gamma \cdot \exp(\beta Y pc))$$

- Where α is the constant "maximum" saturation level. If there were no other variables in place, this is the level that a country will approach as long-term per capita income tends to infinity. γ is the parameter that defines the curvature of the Gompertz curve and β defines the sensitivity to income per capita.
- In the model we also allow different elasticities of the credit ratio to income per capita and to other explanatory variables in the long run versus the medium or the short run. We compute our Credit Gap as the difference between the observed level of the credit ratio and the estimated "structural" long-term level. Therefore, we extend the previous specification to include different sensitivities to income per capita:

$$\frac{C}{Y} = \exp\left[\alpha \cdot \exp\left(\gamma \cdot \exp\left(\beta_{LT}\overline{Ypc}_{it} + \beta_{MT}\widehat{Ypc}_{it} + \beta_{ST}\widehat{Ypc}_{it}\right)\right]$$

- Where $\overline{Ypc_{it}}$ represents the long-term (15 years) moving average of GDP per capita, $\widetilde{Ypc_{it}}$ represents the medium-term deviation of income per capita with respect to its long-term level, i.e. $\widetilde{Ypc_{it}} = (\overline{Ypc_{it}}^{5yr} \overline{Ypc_{it}}^{15yr})$, and $\widehat{Ypc_{it}}$ represents the short-term deviation of the observed income per capita with respect to its medium-term (5-years) moving average, i.e. $\widehat{Ypc_{it}} = (Ypc_{it} \overline{Ypc_{it}}^{5yr})$.
- We define the credit gap as the difference between the current Credit-to-GDP ratio and the "structural" part explained by long-term component of income per capita:

$$CreditGap_{i,t} = \frac{C}{Y} - \left[\exp[\alpha \cdot \exp(\gamma \cdot \exp(\beta_{LT} \overline{Ypc}_{it}) + \emptyset_{LT} \overline{X}_{it}^{15yr}] \right]$$

• The full description of the methodology can be found in https://goo.gl/LTeTHD and https://goo.gl/r0BLbl



Methodology: Early Warning Systems

EWS Banking Crises:

The complete description of the methodology can be found at https://goo.gl/r0BLbl and at https://goo.gl/VA8xXv. A banking crisis is defined as systemic if two conditions are met: 1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations), 2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system. The probability of a crisis is estimated using a panel-logit model with annual data from 68 countries and from 1990 to 2012. The estimated model is then applied to quarterly data. The probability of a crisis is estimated as a function of the following leading indicators (with a 2-years lag):

- Credit-to-GDP Gap (Deviation from an estimated long-term level)
- · Current account balance to GDP
- Short-term interest rate (deviation against US interest rate)
- · Libor interest rate
- · Credit-to-Deposits
- Regulatory Capital to Risk Weighted Assets ratio...

EWS Currency Crises:

We estimate the probability of a currency crisis (a large fall in exchange rate and foreign reserves event) is estimated using a panel-logit model with 78 countries from 1980Q1 to 2015Q4, as a function of the following variables (with an 4-quarters lag):

- Credit-to-GDP ratio Gap (based on HP filter)
- Inflation
- BAA Spread
- Cyclical Current Account (based on HP filter)
- · Short-term interest rate (deviation against US interest rate)
- Libor interest rate (different lags)
- · Real effective exchange rate
- · Investment to GDP
- GDP real growth rate (HP-trend and cyclical deviation from trend)
- · Total trade to GDP



Methodology: Early Warning Systems

EWS Banking Crises Definition of Regions:

- OPEC and Other Oil Exporters: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Canada, Ecuador, Nigeria, Norway, Qatar, Russia and Venezuela
- Emerging Asia: Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.
- · South America & Mexico: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay
- Other LatAm & Caribbean: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama
- Africa & MENA: Botswana, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Namibia and South Africa.
- Emerging Europe: Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Rep, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine
- Core Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom.
- · Periphery Europe: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain
- Advanced Economies: Australia, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Iceland, New Zealand and Switzerland.

EWS Currency Crises Definition of Regions:

- OPEC and Other Oil Exporters: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela
- Emerging Asia: Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.
- South America & Mexico: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay
- Other LatAm & Caribbean: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica and Nicaragua
- Emerging Europe: Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Rep, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine
- Africa & MENA: Botswana, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa and Tunisia
- Advanced Economies: Australia, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand and Switzerland.



This report has been prepared by:

Lead Economist
J. Julián Cubero Calvo

juan.cubero@bbva.com

Maria Sara Baliña Veites mariasara.balina@bbva.com Rodolfo Méndez-Marcano rodolfo.mendez@bbva.com

Jorge Redondo jorge.redondo@bbva.com Alfonso Ugarte Ruiz alfonso.ugarte@bbva.com







