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<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" xmlns:bbvao="https://www.bbva.com/ontology/bbvaontology.owl#" xmlns:ernews="https://www.bbva.com/ontology/ernews.owl#" xmlns:dcterms="http://dublincore.org/2012/06/14/dcterms#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rnews="http://iptc.org/std/rNews/2011-10-07#" xmlns:gnossonto="https://www.bbva.com/ontology/bbvaresearchdigitalpublication.owl#"><bbvao:DigitalPublication rdf:about="Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Data"><bbvao:url rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en">Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Data</bbvao:url><bbvao:url rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[https://js2xjvrn.openweb.bbva/publicaciones/situacion-china-septiembre-2025/]]></bbvao:url><dc:language rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"><![CDATA[en]]></dc:language><dc:language rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"><![CDATA[es]]></dc:language><dc:description rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[As the trade war shock has faded, the recent data surprised the market to the downside as domestic risks take the place of external shock to become the main drag on growth in China.]]></dc:description><dc:description rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Tras disiparse el shock de la guerra comercial, los datos recientes han sorprendido a la baja y se constata que los riesgos domésticos ocupan ahora el lugar de la crisis exterior como principal lastre para el crecimiento de China.]]></dc:description><bbvao:publicationDate rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#date">2025-09-25T11:34:38</bbvao:publicationDate><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[China Economic Outlook, September 2025]]></dc:title><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Situación China. Septiembre 2025]]></dc:title><dc:identifier rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"><![CDATA[49467]]></dc:identifier><bbvao:keypoint rdf:resource="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Keypoint_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_21f0f5b5-afe5-4978-9ff3-3a4699432241"/><bbvao:keypoint rdf:resource="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Keypoint_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_244704e8-5086-4254-87ac-d234d85cb293"/><bbvao:keypoint rdf:resource="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Keypoint_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_3de5c799-27d0-4ba9-985e-d71e87c91477"/><bbvao:keypoint rdf:resource="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Keypoint_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_493ab68a-cc6d-4341-9db7-e53403e10047"/><bbvao:keypoint 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rdf:resource="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Tag_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_e57a9e78-be7f-4e62-b4a0-a8e340256ed7"/><bbvao:attachment rdf:resource="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Attachment_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_e5763040-25f9-439b-9ff8-a6b34db98019"/><dc:coverage rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Global]]></dc:coverage><dc:coverage rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Global]]></dc:coverage><dc:coverage rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Asia]]></dc:coverage><dc:coverage rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Asia]]></dc:coverage><dc:coverage rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[China]]></dc:coverage><dc:coverage rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[China]]></dc:coverage><dc:subject rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Análisis Regional China]]></dc:subject><dc:subject rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Regional Analysis China]]></dc:subject><dc:subject rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Análisis Macroeconómico]]></dc:subject><dc:subject rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Macroeconomic Analysis]]></dc:subject><dc:type rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Informe]]></dc:type><dc:type rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Report]]></dc:type><dc:creator rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"><![CDATA[Jinyue Dong]]></dc:creator><dc:creator rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"><![CDATA[Le Xia]]></dc:creator><dc:creator rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"><![CDATA[Betty Huang]]></dc:creator></bbvao:DigitalPublication><bbvao:Keypoint rdf:about="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Keypoint_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_21f0f5b5-afe5-4978-9ff3-3a4699432241"><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The draft of 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) is to be released in the Q4 2025, which will sketch the blueprint of the economic and social development of the next five years aiming for achieving “socialist modernization” in 2035.]]></dc:title><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[El borrador del 15.º Plan quinquenal (2026-2030) se publicará en el cuarto trimestre de 2025 y esbozará el programa de desarrollo económico y social para los próximos cinco años para lograr la «modernización socialista» en 2035.]]></dc:title></bbvao:Keypoint><bbvao:Keypoint rdf:about="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Keypoint_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_244704e8-5086-4254-87ac-d234d85cb293"><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[We maintain our 2025 GDP forecast at 4.8% and 2026 at 4.5%. As 1H 2025 already reached 5.3%, the authorities have enough maneuvering room to achieve 5% growth target.]]></dc:title><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Mantenemos nuestra previsión del PIB para 2025 en el 4,8% y para 2026 en el 4,5%. Dado que en el primer trimestre de 2025 ya se ha logrado un crecimiento del 5,3%, las autoridades disponen de suficiente margen para alcanzar el objetivo del 5%.]]></dc:title></bbvao:Keypoint><bbvao:Keypoint rdf:about="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Keypoint_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_3de5c799-27d0-4ba9-985e-d71e87c91477"><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The China-US trade war could be viewed as almost settled after four rounds of agreements. But other conflicts in tech war and finance war are set to continue.]]></dc:title><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Después de cuatro rondas de acuerdos, podría decirse que la guerra comercial entre China y EE. UU. prácticamente está zanjada. Sin embargo, todo apunta a que se mantendrán otros conflictos en los frentes tecnológico y financiero.]]></dc:title></bbvao:Keypoint><bbvao:Keypoint rdf:about="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Keypoint_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_493ab68a-cc6d-4341-9db7-e53403e10047"><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[After the tariff war shock stabilized, a number of weaker-than-expected July activity readings surprised the market to the downside. ]]></dc:title><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Tras estabilizarse el shock de la guerra arancelaria, varios indicadores de actividad peores de lo esperado correspondientes a julio han sorprendido a la baja.]]></dc:title></bbvao:Keypoint><bbvao:Keypoint rdf:about="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Keypoint_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_e12abe8e-26c2-42fe-8678-573ab68fee82"><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Domestic headwinds including housing market crash, overcapacity, weak consumption caused by weak employment and income expectations etc. still remain the dominant factors for growth slowdown.]]></dc:title><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Los problemas internos, incluida la crisis del mercado inmobiliario, el exceso de capacidad, la reducción del consumo provocada por la debilidad del empleo y las expectativas de ingresos, entre otras cuestiones, siguen siendo los principales factores causantes de la desaceleración del crecimiento.]]></dc:title></bbvao:Keypoint><bbvao:Tag rdf:about="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Tag_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_08fdbd90-6e2c-4ee5-8de7-8c0787c4ad57"><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[CPI]]></dc:title></bbvao:Tag><bbvao:Tag rdf:about="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Tag_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_5b7ac664-0e2d-4141-b58a-e99cdec20c04"><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[GDP forecast]]></dc:title><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Previsiones del PIB]]></dc:title></bbvao:Tag><bbvao:Tag rdf:about="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Tag_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_6b5926ce-63ad-4987-b2c0-fc0012043930"><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Industrial production]]></dc:title></bbvao:Tag><bbvao:Tag rdf:about="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Tag_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_e57a9e78-be7f-4e62-b4a0-a8e340256ed7"><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Macroeconomics]]></dc:title><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Macroeconomía]]></dc:title></bbvao:Tag><bbvao:Attachment rdf:about="https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/RDF/Gnoss.ApiWrapper.ApiModel.SparqlObject+Dataes#Attachment_0faed263-723f-4571-83b5-6119a88b3d3a_e5763040-25f9-439b-9ff8-a6b34db98019"><bbvao:url rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"><![CDATA[https://js2xjvrn.openweb.bbva/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/202509_China_Outlook2_edi.pdf]]></bbvao:url><dc:description rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"><![CDATA[SEPTEMBER 2025  China Economic Outlook   Content  1  2  3  4  After the three China-US bilateral meetings, the two countries achieved the three Agreements in Geneva, London and Sweden. The Agreements announced a significant reduction of tariffs that the US will reduce the tariffs to China from 145% to 30%, and China will reduce the tariffs to the US from 125% to 10%. That means, the China-US trade war could be viewed as almost settled. But other conflicts in tech war and finance war are set to continue. After the tariff war shock stabilizes, a number of weaker-than-expected July activity readings surprised the market to the downside. Domestic headwinds including housing market crash, overcapacity, weak consumption caused by weak employment and income expectations etc. still remain the dominant factors for China’s growth slowdown. The authorities are expected to unveil more simulative measures to reverse the market sentiments and sustain a decent growth figure in 2H 2025 amid the fading trade war shock and rising domestic risks. We maintain our 2025 GDP forecast at 4.8% and 2026 at 4.5%. As 1H 2025 already reached 5.3%, the authorities have enough maneuvering room to achieve 5% growth target.  The draft of 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) is to be released in the Q4 2025, which will sketch the blueprint of the economic and social development of the next five years aiming for achieving “socialist modernization” in 2035. In addition, the ongoing “Anti-involution” campaign is deleveraging overcapacity sectors such as new energy, steel, cement and food delivery, as well as to curb “price wars” and to arrest accelerating deflation. We also introduce China’s recently established new monetary policy framework at the end of our presentation. p. 2   The timeline of the China-US trade war: focusing on the recent three Agreements Feb 1  US announces 25% tariffs on Canada, Mexico and 10% China. Canada announces two rounds of retaliatory tariffs.  Feb 4  Tariffs on China take effect. China applies new tariffs to US in retaliation.  Feb 5  US temporarily reinstates duty-free shipments from China.  Mar 4  US announces an additional 10% tariff on Chinese imports  Mar 12  China applies new tariffs to US in retaliation by additional 10%.  Apr 2  Trump announces “reciprocal” tariffs of 10%-50% on 185 countries; (China 34%)  Apr 4 Apr 8  Apr 9  US imposes additional 50% tariffs on China Trump announces 90-day moratorium on reciprocal tariffs to countries that have not retaliated but excluded China China announces tariff hike on US by 84% Trump announced to increase China’s tariffs from 104% to 125%, altogether it is 145% tariff rate.  Apr 11  China announced to impose 125% tariffs on US imports from 84% previously  Apr 15  The US announced that China may face at most 245% tariffs.  Source: BBVA Research  May 12  June 7  July 28  Geneva Agreement: the US will reduce the tariffs to China from 145% to 30%, and China will also reduce the tariffs to the US from 125% to 10%. London Agreement: (i) Two sides agreed “in principle” to a framework on how to implement the consensus reached by Geneva Agreement; (ii) The US will allow Chinese college students to attend American universities after “aggressively revoke” students visas. (iii) China’s restrictions on exports of rare earth minerals and magnets to the US will be resolved as a “fundamental” part of the agreement. Trump said a “deal” with China has been completed. Sweden Agreement: China and US held the 3nd meeting in Sweden, in which China will continue to suspend its earlier tariff hike for 90 days, while retaining a 10% duty and the US extended the tariff suspension on China for another 90 days.  p. 3   A summary of key points of China-US three Agreements: Geneva-London-Sweden Key contents:  TARIFFS:  i. Tariff Reductions: Effective from May 14, 2025, the U.S. reduces tariffs on Chinese goods from 145% to 30%, while China reduces tariffs on U.S. imports from 125% to 10%.  CHINA EXPORTS TO THE US  US EXPORTS TO CHINA  ii. Non-Tariff Measures: China revoked export bans on certain rare earth elements and blacklist some US firms while the US permitted Nvidia to export H20 chips to China iii. Fentanyl Precursors: Both acknowledged the importance of addressing the flow of fentanyl precursors from China to the U.S.  iv. 90-day tariff suspension : China and the US will continue to suspend its earlier tariff hike for 90 days. Source: website news and BBVA Research  p. 4   Economic outlook in 2025 hinges on three key factors  Tariff war  Domestic risks 2025 Chinese Economy Stimulus package  Source: NBS and BBVA Research  p. 5   Three rounds of stimulus package: 2024-2025  The 1st round stimulus (2024 Sep 24)  The 2nd round stimulus (2025 March “two sessions”)  Interest rate cut and RRR cut  2025 growth target “around 5%”  Housing stimulus (Cut the rate for the existed residential mortgage by 50 bps. Lower down payment ratio for second house purchase to 15% from 25%)  Inflation target at 2% instead of previous 3% cap  Local government debt swap program Consumption stimulus programs (”Large-scale equipment renewal and consumer goods trade-in”）  Fiscal deficit budget in 2025 surpassed the 3% red line to be set at 4%. “Modestly loose” monetary policy to support growth  The 3nd round stimulus (2025 May 7) i.  Cut RRR by 0.5%, releasing 1 trillion RMB in long-term liquidity.  ii. The RRR for auto finance and financial leasing companies was reduced from 5% to 0% iii. The 7-day reverse repo rate was reduced from 1.5% to 1.4%, lowering the Loan Prime Rate (LPR) by 0.1%. iv. The personal housing provident fund loan rate was reduced by 0.25% to 2.6%. v. Re-lending facility supports technology, industrial upgrading, service consumption, agriculture and SMEs. vi. Capital market support.  The recent and further stimulus (more structural): i.  ii.  iii.  iv. v. vi. vii.  Source: NBS and BBVA Research  Subsidies for boosting birth: RMB 3,600 (USD 500) per baby (]]></dc:description><dc:format rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[PDF]]></dc:format><dc:format rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[PDF]]></dc:format><dc:title rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"><![CDATA[Situación China. Septiembre 2025]]></dc:title><dc:contentType rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Presentación]]></dc:contentType><dc:contentType rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Presentation]]></dc:contentType><dcterms:language rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Inglés]]></dcterms:language><dcterms:language rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[English]]></dcterms:language></bbvao:Attachment></rdf:RDF>
