

# European and Spanish Economic Outlook

#### **Rafael Doménech**

London, March 31, 2014



# Main messages

- The global economic cycle is improving and we expect a moderate acceleration in growth in 2014-15 supported by the developed economies
- Some economic policy uncertainties have been resolved but there are still risks, although not of a systemic nature, as it was the case in the past
- For the first time since the beginning of the crisis the risks to our forecasts for the Spanish economy are to the upside. The recovery is being driven by exports, import substitution and the recovery in new lending. In addition, both financial tensions and fiscal consolidation are less intense
- The scope of the reforms needs to be expanded if they are to underpin a robust and sustained recovery, and reverse the jobs destroyed within a reasonable period



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#### Global economy: a gradual acceleration supported by developed economies

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Spain: upside risks for the first time since the beginning of the crisis


Section 3

Commitment to the reforms is crucial to consolidate recent market improvement and increase potential growth



# Global growth will increase in 2014 an 2015

- The global expansion will continue in 2014-15 this time around with higher contributions from advanced economies
- Growth risks are more balanced with upward risks in the US and downward risks that remain:
  - the exit from QE and flows to emerging markets,
  - the uneven recoveries and vulnerabilities in EMs, and
  - the Eurozone






# The global momentum is improving

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**BBVA Eagles** 

**HSBC Emerging Markets Index** 






# The eurozone: positive growth with an increasing role of domestic demand

#### **Eurozone: GDP growth** (y/y)

Source: BBVA Research



Exports will remain as the main driver of growth in both 2013 and 2014

Domestic demand has weighed on growth in 2013, but will contribute to the recovery in 2014-15

Overall: lower financial tensions, higher global growth, lower fiscal drag, ECB's loosening bias and Banking Union




# Drivers of (still slow) growth in the eurozone

- 1) The external environment remains positive
- 2) Financial conditions have improved, especially in the periphery
  - 3) The fiscal stance is less restrictive
- 4) The banking union is advancing, with bank exams and single supervision in 2014



# Growth at diverse paces and with different risks ...



Growth cycle strengthens, mainly in advanced economies and in some emerging economies. Economic policy remains as a supportive factor for growth in 2014-15


To reinforce the baseline scenario, policymakers have to tackle domestic vulnerabilities: banking issues and disinflation risks in the Eurozone, financial vulnerabilities in China, and private domestic demand in emerging economies

The impact of FED's tapering over global funding conditions, in the US and beyond, remains as a factor of uncertainty



# ... with a widespread recovery across EMU countries ...

### GDP growth by country (%) Source: BBVA Research



Current Forecast (February 14)

-Previous Forecast (November 13)

Germany: slight upward revision. Mild recovery on track supported by domestic fundamentals

France: GDP virtually flat in 2013 while the moderate recovery for 2014 will depend on the economic policy implementation

Italy: though activity stabilised in 2H13, sharp downward in 2013, Slight growth in 2014, but downside risks increase



# ... but with some important uncertainties for 2014

World: (1) risk of a sudden slowdown in emerging countries and its ability to rebalance its growth path (e.g., China), (2) effects on capital flows and financial conditions from Fed exit strategy, and (3) geopolitical

U.S.: (1) risks in Fed exit strategy, (2) debt ceiling and fiscal consolidation in the long run, and (3) growth potential and doubts on secular stagnation

EMU: (1) persistence of sovereign risk and financial fragmentation, (2) process to the Banking Union Bank (AQR and stress tests), (3) risk of deflation and the burden of a very low inflation, and (4) Greece and Portugal programmes

Spain: political environment, scope of structural reforms, potential growth, recovery with a very low inflation in EMU, fiscal consolidation and banking restructuring process



# Asymmetric shocks and an incomplete union in EMU

	Shocks					
	Symmetric	Asymmetric				
Complete union	USA					
Incomplete union		EMU				

Differences in the asymmetry of shocks and institutions have resulted in very different response of economic policies during the crisis, ...


... which now are affecting the effectiveness of the ECB to ensure its inflation target and to anchor inflation expectations



# Asymmetric shocks and an incomplete union in EMU

#### GDP per working age population 2Q08=100

Source: Eurostat and BBVA Research



As a result of the imbalances accumulated before and during the crisis, and the lack of banking, fiscal and economic union ...

... EMU countries exhibit large differences in unemployment rates and in GDP per workingage population, ...

... which are correlated with creditor and debtor positions of each country -> consensus on European economic policy is difficult



#### 1. Financial uncertainties

# Banking union: key to reduce financial fragmentation

#### Setting up a robust supranational framework



#### Common Rules

- Prudential (Basel III), resolution framework (bail-in), harmonised deposit protection rules
- Start: 2014 2016



Pillar II

- responsible regulatory
  authority for all eurozone
  banks
- **Direct supervisor** of top 130 banks
- National authorities will supervise the less significant entities
- Start: **04/11/2014**

# Pillar III Single Resolution

Single Depo Guarantee

Pillar IV

• Start: unknown

Scheme

- New Single Resolution
   Authority in co-operation
   with national resolution
   authorities
- Single Resolution Fund funded by bank contributions
- Start: 2015 2016




#### 1. Financial uncertainties

# Banking union: key to reduce financial fragmentation

# Eurozone: interest rates of government bonds and new loans to non-financial firms, 2013

Source: BBVA Research based on ECB



Despite the significant fall of financial tensions, financial fragmentation is still important ...

... interest rates of government bonds and new loans to non-financial firms highly correlated: sovereign and banking risks spillovers still remarkable ...

... particularly in countries where inflation is low -> differences in real interest rates larger than in nominal ones

Real interest rates in EMU countries with high unemployment rate much larger than in countries with low unemployment rate




#### 2. The costs and risks of a low inflation recovery

# Trend inflation & expectations well below the ECB target

#### **Eurozone: unemployment rate and inflation**

Source: Eurostat and BBVA Research



The regression coefficient of the inflation rate on the unemployment rate is equal to 0.125, statistically significant and robust to the exclusion of Cyprus, Greece and Spain.

The double-dip recession (unemployment) and M3 growth partially explain the low rate of inflation in EMU

If 3 pp of higher unemployment explain 0.4 pp lower inflation, inflation expectations are currently less than 1.2% -> drag for the economic recovery


Inflation expectations in swaps and trimmed mean inflation (optimal selection in terms of inflation prediction for next 2/3 years) are about 1%


Although the probability of deflation is low (<10%) the combination of adverse shocks and expectations downward significantly increase this probability



#### 2. The costs and risks of a low inflation recovery

# Trend inflation & expectations well below the ECB target







2. The costs and risks of a low inflation recovery

# ECB: ready for further action?

#### Latest

- Rates were kept unchanged. They retain a downward bias
- Mr. Draghi once again used verbal intervention to strengthen his forward guidance
- Inflation significantly below 2% for a long period of time (1.5% for 2016)
- Mr. Draghi seemed to downplay the potential role of other instruments available for eventual further policy action

#### What do we expect?

Once it has become clear that the ECB is ready to accept inflation of 1.5% in 2016 without taking further action, the expectation of further (decisive) measures in the short-term in the absence of sizeable shocks is very low

Any and all liquidity measures remain on the table (SMP non-sterilisation) in the event of an unwarranted tightening in money markets

Do not expect a weakening of the euro in the very short run

Policy pause until 2016


Will the ECB change its mind towards QE?



#### 3. The risks of a sudden stop in emerging economies

# EMU fragile recovery may be affected by external factors

#### EMU: historical decomposition of GDP per wap (%, y/y)



The first part of the double-dip crisis in EMU was driven by financial tensions and the collapse of external trade

Although of a milder magnitude, a sudden stop in emerging countries could have significant effects on EMU recovery

Similarly, Fed exit strategy may affect financial conditions in EMU



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Commitment to the reforms is crucial to consolidate the improvement in the markets and increase potential growth



# The recovery of the Spanish economy is confirmed ...

#### **Spain: GDP growth and MICA-BBVA forecasts** (% QoQ)

Source: BBVA Research based on INE



After three years in recession, domestic demand started to make a positive contribution to growth again in the second half of 2013...

... as a consequence of improved fundamentals, less restrictive fiscal policy, reduced uncertainty and increased import substitution

The available information points to growth of at least 0.4% in 1Q14




# ... the risks are to the upside for the first time

#### Spain: GDP growth forecasts, 2014

(% YoY)

Source: BBVA Research based on Consensus Forecast Inc.



Economic policy decisions have eliminated the risk scenarios

The differential performance of the Spanish economy confirms this improvement in the trend


If these trends are confirmed, growth could be even stronger than we are forecasting



## Upside risks:

# 1. Exports will continue to expand

#### Spain: growth and breakdown of goods exports by **broad geographical area**Source: BBVA Research based on Datacomex



We expect the recovery to continue driven by the increase in exports

The deceleration in exports is a temporary phenomenon and will reverse in a scenario of stronger global growth

The slowing momentum in EMs has been offset by the recovery in the EMU

Nominal growth, 4Q13 average % YoY (LHS)


Share over total exports in 2013 (%, RHS)



# Upside risks 2. An increase in savings and financial wealth

#### Spain: net real household financial wealth

(Deflated by the private consumption deflator; seasonally adjusted data) Source: BBVA Research based on Bank of Spain and INE



■ Real net financial wealth (billion €)

The increase in corporate and household savings has been an essential part of the recoveries in Spain ...

... that has helped in the deleveraging process and in the improvement in the financial situation of the private sector ...


... and these, together with the stabilisation and improvement in the value of wealth, has driven an increase in consumption and investment



# Upside risks 3. More certainty and fewer financial tensions

#### Spain: 10Y bond yield

(Difference vs. our November 2013 forecast in bp)



Improved international perceptions of the Spanish economy have allowed Spain to reduce its dependence on ECB funding

Reduced financial tensions are reflected in the economy with a lag of 6-9 months


A permanent 100bp drop in sovereign interest rates implies up to one percentage point more growth for the economy



## Upside risks 4. More dynamic investment

# **Spain: exports and investment in equipment and machinery** (2008=100)

Source: BBVA Research based on INE



The recovery we expect in the EMU and the continuing export growth ...

... should translate into an increase in privatesector investment

In fact, the investment in equipment and machinery had grown 6.3% by 4Q13



# Upside risks 5. Improvement in new lending flows

# Spain: new lending and credit to households, NPISH and non-financial entities

Source: BBVA Research based on Bank of Spain (February 2014)



The Spanish economy is going through an evitable deleveraging process ...

... that is compatible with new lending for financially viable projects

There has been a turning point and an improvement in corporate lending, which we expect to consolidate in 1H14



### Upside risks 6. A smaller fiscal effort needed in 2014

#### Public sector: breakdown of the public deficit excluding aid to the financial sector



The significant fiscal consolidation efforts in 2012 and 2013 ...

... have resulted in containment of the public deficit at 6.6% of GDP ...


... therefore allowing for a smaller fiscal effort needed in 2014



# Upside risks 7. Changes in the labour market

#### **Spain: LFS employment**

(Variation in annual average, %)
Source: BBVA Research based on INF



Net job-creation has started sooner than we expected, partly as a reflection of wage moderation

Had labour institutions been better at the beginning of the crisis, millions of job losses could have been avoided

Employment growth in 2014. Additionally the fixed social security contribution for permanent contracts can boost employment



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
Spain: commitment to the reforms is crucial to consolidate the improvement in the markets and increase potential growth



# The need to broaden the scope of the reform agenda

#### **GDP** growth and job-creation

Source: BBVA Research and Lebergott (1964)



Assumptions for the USA and the EMU are consistent with BBVA Research's scenario. The Spanish scenario has been built assuming both that producvity per worker rises 0,6% (as it was the case between 1992 and 2007) and that GDP grows on average 2,5.

The recovery in employment will be very sensitive to economic growth

The objective should be to introduce the necessary reforms to increase economic growth to close to or more than 2.5%


Unless this happens, job-creation will be limited and the recovery slow



# An efficient tax system and fiscal sustainability

#### Spain: unemployment and public deficit

Source: BBVA Research based on INE and MINHAP



Tax revenues dropped sharply in Spain as a consequence of the recession ...

... and the fiscal consolidation process requires sufficient resources to ensure that Spain's finances remain in good health...

... but with a structure that drives economic growth and job-creation, two key factors for reducing the deficit



# The need to broaden the scope of the reform agenda

- 1. To continue the deleveraging and improvement in the finances of the Spanish economy: finalising the restructuring of the financial sector and attracting foreign direct investment
- 2. Public-sector reform, fiscal consolidation and long-term sustainability of public finances, with an efficient tax system that create incentives to growth and job-creation -> Report of the Experts Committee
- 3. Reforms to improve competitiveness further (internal devaluation), increase the international attraction of Spain in terms of physical, human and technological capital
- 4. To continue with the reforms that reduce the duality in the labour market, improve the way it functions and increase employability
  -> more and better-quality jobs



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# Macroeconomic scenario

(0/ )/ )/)	2012		2013 (f)		2014 (f)		2015 (f)	
(% YoY)	S pain	E MU	S pain	E MU	S pain	E MU	S pain	E MU
Households final consumption expenditure	-2,8	-1,4	-2,5	-0,5	0,9	0,7	1,3	1,2
General government final consumption exp.	-4,8	-0,5	-1,2	0,3	-1,1	0,5	1,3	0,7
Gross fixed capital formation (G.F.C.F.)	-7,0	-3,9	-5,9	-3,1	0,2	1,6	5,2	5,0
E quipment and cultivated assets	-3,9	-4,4	0,8	-2,5	6,0	2,8	7,8	7,1
E quipment and machinery	-3,9	-4,4	0,7	-2,5	5,8	2,9	7,8	7,1
Housing	-8,7	-3,4	-8,4	-3,0	-3,4	1,0	5,0	3,6
O ther constructions	-10,6	-4,8	-11,8	-4,9	-4,2	-0,7	1,5	2,9
Changes in inventories (*)	0,0	-0,5	0,0	-0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Domestic Demand (*)	-4,1	-2,1	-2,8	-0,9	0,4	0,8	2,0	1,7
Exports	2,1	2,7	5,2	1,2	6,5	3,5	6,7	4,9
Imports	-5,7	-0,8	0,3	0,2	5,2	3,3	7,4	5,1
External Demand (*)	2,5	1,5	1,6	0,5	0,6	0,3	-0,1	0,2
GDP mp	-1,6	-0,6	-1,2	-0,4	0,9	1,1	1,9	1,9
Pro-me moria								
GDP excluding housing	-1,2	-0,5	-0,8	-0,2	1,2	1,1	1,8	1,8
GDP excluding contruction	-0,4	-0,2	-0,1	0,0	1,5	1,2	1,8	1,7
Total employment (LFS)	-4,5	-0,7	-3,1	-0,8	0,4	0,1	1,0	0,7
Unemployment rate (% Active pop.)	25,0	11,4	26,4	12,1	25,6	12,0	24,8	11,6
Current account balance (% GDP)	-1,1	1,2	0,9	2,1	1,6	2,1	1,7	2,0
Public debt (% GDP) (**)	86,0	93,0	94,7	95,6	99,1	96,1	101,4	95,7
Public deficit (% GDP)	-6,8	-3,7	-7,0	-2,8	-5,8	-2,4	-5,1	-2,1
CPI (average)	2,4	2,5	1,4	1,4	0,5	1,0	1,0	1,4
CPI (end of period)	2,9	2,2	0,3	0,8	0,7	1,3	1,2	1,5

<sup>(\*)</sup> Contribution to GDP Growth

<sup>(\*\*)</sup> Excluding aid to the banking sector in Spain

<sup>(</sup>f): forecast



# Changes in the corporate insolvency law will facilitate corporate debt restructuring

New measures announced last week remove obstacles to agreements between financial creditors and debtors

#### New RDL on corporate debt restructuring

Source: BBVA Research based on BOE

#### Measures

- ✓ Possibility of individual debt refinancing agreements
- ✓ Simplified procedures for collective debt refinancing agreements
- ✓ Reduction in the level of required majorities to impose refinancing agreements on dissident creditors
- ✓ BoS needs to develop new provisioning framework for refinanced loans
- ✓ In case of insolvency, fresh money with privileged status and old debt non-subordinated
- ✓ Takeover exemption when creditors convert into equity
- ✓ Other measures: including fiscal benefits...

#### **Spanish Financial System**

- Increases legal certainty
- If restructuring ends in insolvency, financial creditors are not in a worse position
- Foreseeable better provisioning framework
- Conversion of debt into equity raises new issues (management, capital consumption..)

- Deleveraging of worst quality loans
- · Adjustment of debt to companies' financial capacity
- New funding for viable business plans